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ENGLISH-ONLY POLICIES IN THE WORKPLACE: DISPARATE
IMPACT COMPARED TO THE EEOC GUIDELINES
INTRODUCTION
According to the 2000 census, in the United States between 1990
and 2000 the foreign-born population increased by more than half.1 The
2000 census also revealed that forty-seven million people speak a lan-
guage other than English at home.2 The number of employees who speak
a foreign language at work has also increased substantially.3 In order to
combat problems associated with this increase, such as effective supervi-
sion, safety, efficiency, and workplace disruptions,4 employers are im-
plementing English-only policies. English-only policies prohibit speak-
ing any language except English during some or all of the work day. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") reports that the
increased use of these policies by employers led to quintuple complaints
by employees alleging discrimination on the basis of English-only rules
between 1996 and 2000.5
These complaints have arisen because language is a part of national
origin, which is protected under Title VII. While protection arises under
Title VII, there is a split between the Ninth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit
over how to analyze cases concerning discrimination based on national
origin as a result of English-only policies. This split highlights compet-
ing values: the value of language as a part of a person's national origin
and the value of an employer's freedom in determining how to run his or
her business safely and efficiently.6
In addressing these competing values, there are two possible ap-
proaches: 1) the EEOC Guidelines; and 2) disparate impact analysis.
The EEOC Guidelines presume English-only policies lead to discrimina-
1. Nolan Malone, Kaari F. Baluja, Joseph M. Costanzo & Cynthia J. Davis, The Foreign-
Born Population: 2000, Census 2000 Brief, 2, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-34.pdf ("Between 1990 and 2000, the foreign-born
population increased by 57 percent, from 19.8 million to 31.1 million, compared with an increase of
9.3 percent for the native population and 13 percent for the total U.S. population.").
2. Hyon B. Shin & Rosalind Bruno, Language Use and English-Speaking Ability: 2000,
Census 2000 Brief, at 2, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-29.pdf ("The
number and percentage of people in the United States who spoke a language other than English at
home increased between 1990 and 2000. In 2000, 18 percent of the total population aged 5 and
over, or 47.0 million people, reported they spoke a language other than English at home.").
3. See Juan F. Perea, English-Only Rules and the Right to Speak One's Primary Language in
the Workplace, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 265,267 (1990).
4. See id. at 305-16.
5. HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
AND PRACTICE 81 (2d'ed. 2001).
6. Perea, supra note 3, at 315 ("[E]mployers may be able to justify English-only rules that
are not unduly discriminatory, based on safety and efficiency.").
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tion in the workplace.7 In contrast, the disparate impact analysis requires
the employee to carry the initial burden of proving the policy led to dis-
crimination or harm.8
The Ninth Circuit has been the leading source of case law on the is-
sue of English-only policies. In 1993, the Ninth Circuit explicitly re-
jected the EEOC guidelines and applied a disparate impact analysis to
find that an employer did not discriminate based on an English-only pol-
icy.9 This was the controlling decision on English-only policies until a
2006 decision from the Tenth Circuit in Maldonado v. City of Altus.'
0
The Tenth Circuit decision departed from the current law in the Ninth
Circuit by not explicitly rejecting or adopting the EEOC guidelines on
English-only policies.1" Rather, the Tenth Circuit discussed the EEOC
guidelines and also applied a disparate impact analysis to find that sum-
mary judgment for the employer was not appropriate. 12
The split between the Ninth and the Tenth Circuit is important be-
cause it shows that there is a conflict over what analysis, the EEOC
guidelines or disparate impact, courts should utilize in considering Eng-
lish-only policies. It is imperative that the courts use one analysis or the
other because applying both creates confusion over what policies em-
ployers can implement without violating the law and what rights em-
ployees have to speak a foreign language in the workplace. The dispa-
rate impact analysis should be applied, not the EEOC guidelines, because
disparate impact balances the importance of language with the impor-
tance of allowing employers to run safe and efficient businesses; and a
disparate impact analysis is also consistent with legislative intent.
Part I of this comment addresses the disparate treatment and dispa-
rate impact analyses used for claims arising under Title VII. Part I also
reviews the EEOC guidelines and their treatment of English-only poli-
cies. Part II of this comment explores the Ninth Circuit decisions regard-
ing challenges to English-only policies. Part III discusses the lower
courts' decisions and provides a detailed review of Maldonado. Part IV
analyzes the disparate impact approach and the EEOC guidelines and
argues that the disparate impact approach properly balances the rights of
employers and employees, unlike the EEOC guidelines, because dispa-
rate impact protects language as a part of national origin, while also al-
lowing employers to run safe and efficient businesses. Part IV also ar-
gues that the disparate impact approach is consistent with the legislative
intent of Title VII.
7. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (West 2007).
8. Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1304 (10th Cir. 2006).
9. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993).
10. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1305.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1306.
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I. BACKGROUND
Claims based on national origin arise under Title VII, which re-
quires either a disparate treatment or a disparate impact analysis. The
EEOC, in contrast, has specific guidelines for addressing discrimination
claims as a result of English-only policies.
A. Title VII
Under Title VII § 2000e-2(a):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin.
13
Courts and legal commentators assert that speaking a foreign language
may make someone a protected group member based on national ori-
gin. 14 Therefore, claims concerning English-only policies fall under Title
VII as either disparate treatment claims or disparate impact claims based
on national origin.' 5  In the employment context, disparate treatment
protects employees against employment practices or policies involving
intentional discrimination, while disparate impact protects employees
against policies or practices that are substantively neutral, but lead to
discrimination in practice.
1. Disparate Treatment
Disparate treatment applies when an employer intentionally dis-
criminates against an employee, usually through an employment action
such as hiring, firing or an employment policy, because that employee is
a protected group member based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin under Title VII. 16 The Supreme Court set out a method for prov-
ing disparate treatment in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.7 First,
the Court determined that the plaintiff employee bears the initial burden
of proof in a disparate treatment claim.' 8 If that burden is satisfied, the
burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employment action or policy.' 9 If the em-
13. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (West 2007).
14. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union of Oklahoma Foundation as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellants at 6, Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-
6062) [hereinafter Brief for ACLU] ("Courts have long recognized that an individual's primary
language is a trait closely tied to national origin."); Wayne N. Outten & Kathleen Peratis, National
Origin Discrimination, 676 PLI/Lit 291, 299-300, 318-23 (2002); Perea, supra note 3, at 274-79.
15. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993).
16. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1484.
17. 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).




ployer succeeds, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the
employer's nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision or
policy is a pretext for discrimination.2 °
The underlying theory of disparate treatment is that a policy or em-
ployment decision is discriminatory when an employer treats an em-
ployee differently "because of' race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin, the protected characteristics covered by Title VII. 21 In Hazen Pa-
per Company v. Biggins,22 the Supreme Court decision turned on
whether an employee was terminated because of his age in violation of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) or if the employee
was terminated because his pension was about to vest, which while ille-
gal, did not violate the ADEA.23 The Court concluded that even if the
reason for the employment action, firing the employee to prevent his
retirement plan from vesting, was "correlated with" his age, the correla-
tion was not enough to prove discrimination "because of' age.24
Challenges to English-only policies usually involve policies that re-
quire all groups to speak English. Even though this type of policy may
correlate to national origin, because it treats all employees the same way
and does not single out employees because of national origin, the policy
will not ordinarily lead to disparate treatment. In order to prove that an
employer implemented an English-only policy because of an employee's
national origin, the policy would have to be drafted to require "members
of one national origin group to speak English while allowing members of
another national origin group to speak another language., 26 An English-
only policy will usually not be drafted this way. Instead, an English-only
policy is more likely to require all employees to speak English, which is
substantively neutral, 27 but may have a disparate impact on non-English
speaking employees in practice.
2. Disparate Impact
The disparate impact burden-shifting analysis was established in
1971 in the case of Griggs v. Duke Power Company.28 The key differ-
ence between disparate treatment and disparate impact is that disparate
treatment addresses a policy with a discriminatory intent, while disparate
impact addresses a policy that leads to discrimination in practice.29
20. Id. at 804.
21. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993).
22. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 604.
23. Id. at 609-11.
24. Id. at 611.
25. LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 5, at 80.
26. David T. Wiley, Note, Whose Proof.: Deference to EEOC Guidelines on Disparate
Impact Discrimination Analysis of "English-Only '" Rules, 29 GA. L. REV. 539, 549 (1995).
27. LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 5, at 80 ("[E]mployer practices or rules based on language
characteristics will usually... be neutral on their face.").
28. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-33 (1971).
29. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1484.
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Twenty years later, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("1991 Act") reaffirmed
that the standard outlined by Griggs is the standard that should be ap-
plied in disparate impact cases.30
The Griggs disparate impact analysis has four parts. First, the
plaintiff employee must identify a discriminatory practice, which in the
context of this paper is an English-only policy.31 Second, the plaintiff
employee must show that the practice has a discriminatory impact in
operation, regardless of the employer's intent.32 To show this discrimi-
natory impact, the employee may not simply claim that the policy
harmed members of his or her protected class.33 The employee must
prove that the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" were
denied to the protected class and that this was a significant harm that did
not affect employees that were not part of the protected class.34 Third,
the employer may show business necessity as an affirmative defense.35
The Court in Griggs emphasized that in a disparate impact analysis
"[t]he touchstone is business necessity" because "good intent or absence
of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures.,'36 To
protect employees from the "consequences of employment practices, not
simply the motivation," the Griggs Court found that there must be a
business necessity to justify an employment policy or procedure that
discriminates in practice.37
While the description of business necessity from the Griggs case is
ambiguous, the 1991 Act affirmed that under Griggs the employer had
the burden of proof to show business necessity as an affirmative defense
"to justify a practice shown to have a disparate impact. 38 The 1991 Act
stated that "statistical reports, validation studies, expert testimony, [or]
prior successful experience" may prove business necessity. 39 Despite the
lack of a clear definition of business necessity, the burden lies with the
employer to show business necessity once an employee proves a policy
creates a disparate impact.
Finally, if the employer proves business necessity the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff employee who can still prove a Title VII violation by
showing there is a lesser discriminatory alternative to the English-only
30. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k) (West 2007); H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 24 (1991) ("In Griggs
and its progeny, the courts fashioned a workable and widely accepted set of legal principles for
resolving the problems caused by employment practices which, while neutral on their face, dispro-
portionately exclude qualified workers on the basis of their sex, national origin, race or religion.").
31. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
32. Id.
33. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486.
34. Id.
35. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
36. Id. at 431-32.
37. Id. at 432.
38. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(l), at 28 (1991).
39. Id., at 38.
2007] 905
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policy.40 The employee can prove this by showing that another method
would serve the employer's purposes without the disparate impact of the
current practice. 41 For example, if an employer requires all potential job
applicants without a high school diploma to pass a standardized test to be
considered for a job and the test excludes a particular race, the employee
may show there are other tests or methods of selecting viable job appli-
cants as a less discriminatory alternative.42
In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,43 the Su-
preme Court found that a statute requiring a hiring preference for veter-
ans, which excluded mostly women, was not discriminatory based on sex
because all non-veterans, male and female alike, were equally burdened
by the statute. 44 A policy has a disparate impact when it places a group
protected under Title VII at a relative disadvantage, not when it places
protected and non-protected groups alike at a disadvantage.45
Under an English-only policy requiring all employees to speak Eng-
lish without exception, employees are treated equally for the purposes of
disparate treatment analysis and are not entitled to recover for discrimi-
nation.46 However, because non-English speakers may be alienated from
the English speakers and placed at a disadvantage in practice, disparate
impact analysis provides a promising alternative for proving discrimina-
tion. While facially neutral, these policies have a more burdensome ef-
fect on persons of particular national origins.4 7 Accordingly, most claims
regarding English-only policies should require a disparate impact analy-
sis.
B. EEOC Guidelines
The EEOC guidelines recommend different burdens specifically for
cases dealing with English-only policies. 48 First, the EEOC guidelines
state that an English-only policy "requiring employees to speak only
English at all times" creates a presumption that the policy violates Title
VII.4 9 Second, the guidelines address English-only policies applied only
at certain times.50 An employer may show that the policy is "justified by
business necessity" under the guidelines only if the English-only policy
is limited to specific periods during the workday.51 Finally, there must
40. See MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 376-77 (1988).
41. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 42 (1991).
42. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-33; PLAYER, supra note 40, at 376-77.
43. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
44. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275.
45. See id.
46. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486.
47. See Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1298; Spun. Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483; Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct.,
838 F.2d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 1988).
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be notice of the English-only policy or any employment action taken
against an employee based on the policy will be considered evidence of a
Title VII violation.52
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT
While many lower courts have considered English-only policies in
the workplace since the enactment of the EEOC guidelines, the Ninth
Circuit has been the leading source of case law on the issue.53
A. Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corporation
5 4
A radio disc jockey was fired when he refused to comply with an
English-only order from his employer to alter his radio personality by
eliminating the "street Spanish" used in his program." The employer
decided to eliminate Spanish because the show was not attracting the
Hispanic demographic.
56
The Ninth Circuit primarily applied a disparate treatment analysis.
57
The court found that the radio station did not have a discriminatory mo-
tive for ordering an English-only approach on the radio show. 8 The
court found the decision was made strictly based on the radio station's
attempt to attract listeners.59 Therefore, the court concluded summary
judgment for the employer was properly granted.60
The court briefly discussed the employee's disparate impact claim,
citing Griggs for the requirement that the employee has the burden of
establishing a prima facie disparate impact case.6' The court concluded
that the lower court properly decided that the policy did not "dispropor-
tionately disadvantage" Hispanics and, therefore, the employee did not
establish a prima facie case.
62
B. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court
6 3
The Municipal Court in Los Angeles employed bilingual deputy
court clerks to translate for the Spanish speaking public.64 The Munici-
pal Court put a policy into place requiring English-only at all times dur-
ing the work day, unless employees were translating for a member of the
52. Id.
53. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct., 838
F.2d 1031, 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).
54. 813 F.2d 1406 (9" Cir. 1987).
55. Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1408.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1409.
58. Id. at 1410.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1411.
61. Id. at 1412.
62. Id.
63. 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988).
64. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1036.
2007)
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public.65 Originally, this policy did not include breaks, but it was ex-
tended so that English was required during lunch and breaks.66
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the preliminary injunction issued by the
district court to prevent employers from enforcing the English-only pol-
icy.67 After establishing that "language is an important aspect of national
origin" and discussing the requirements from the EEOC guidelines, the
court adopted the EEOC's "business necessity test.' ' 68 The court also
went on to find that "[t]here can be no doubt that the use of disparate
impact analysis is appropriate here., 69 The court affirmed that the Eng-
lish-only policy created a disparate impact because "the prohibition on
intra-employee communications in Spanish is sweeping in nature and has
a direct effect on the general atmosphere and environment of the work
place., 70 Next, the court found that all of the business necessities pre-
sented by the employer were not adequate, including the justifications
that the United States is an English speaking country and California is an
English speaking state; permitting Spanish to be spoken by employees
outside of their work duties is disruptive; the policy promotes racial har-
mony; and supervisors do not speak or understand Spanish.71 Conse-
quently, the court concluded that the injunction was proper.72
C. Garcia v. Spun Steak
73
An English-only policy was implemented by the employer, a poul-
try and meat products producer, to promote racial harmony, improve
worker safety, and facilitate better supervision.74 The policy allowed
employees to speak Spanish during breaks and excluded employees who
did not speak English.75  Two bilingual employees, production line
workers for the company, received warning letters when they violated
the policy and were no longer allowed to work next to each other.76
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Gutierrez, the Ninth
Circuit in Spun Steak explicitly rejected the EEOC guidelines and ap-
plied a disparate impact analysis.77 The court reasoned that the EEOC




68. Id. at 1039-40.
69. Id. at 1040.
70. Id. at 1041.
71. Id. at 1041-44.
72. Id. at 1045.
73. 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993).
74. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77, Id. at 1489.
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run a business and the prevention of discrimination, which was inconsis-
tent with the legislative intent of Title VII.
78
The court also noted that while the facts in the case did not show a
Title VII violation:
Whether a working environment is infused with discrimination is a
factual question, one for which a per se rule is particularly inappro-
priate. The dynamics of an individual workplace are enormously
complex; we cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that the introduc-
tion of an English-only policy, in every workplace, will always have
the same effect.
79
Under the disparate impact analysis, the court concluded that the em-
ployees did not establish a prima facie case.80 The court emphasized that
there was no evidence that the policy created a hostile working environ-
ment.81 The court also noted that the employees did not have a right to
self-expression in the workplace, and as bilingual speakers they were
only inconvenienced by the policy.82 Finally, the court concluded that
even though the bilingual employees did not establish a prima facie case,
the case for monolingual employees was remanded to consider if the
policy created a disparate impact on those employees.83
III. TENTH CIRCUIT
The district courts in the Tenth Circuit did not follow the lead of the
Ninth Circuit. Likewise, the Tenth Circuit failed to take a definitive
stance on the EEOC guidelines or the disparate impact analysis.
A. Lower Court Decisions Leading up to Maldonado
The decisions of the district courts in the Tenth Circuit leading up to
Maldonado v. City of Altus,8 4 failed to embrace either the disparate im-
pact analysis or the EEOC guidelines.85
In Tran v. Standard Motor Products,86 employees alleged an Eng-
lish-only policy that was applied during employee-supervisor meetings
and while employees were working violated Title VII. 87 The district
court analyzed the issue on the premise that while the Tenth Circuit had
78. Id. at 1489-90.
79. Id. at 1489 (responding to the employees' request for the court to adopt a per se rule that
English-only policies always create a hostile working environment).
80. Id. at 1490.
81. Id. at 1489.
82, Id. at 1487-88.
83. Id. at 1490.
84. 433 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2006).
85. Barber v. Lovelace Sandia Health Sys., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1327-28 (D.N.M. 2005),
Olivarez v. Centura Health Corp., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1224-25 (D. Colo. 2002), Tran v. Standard
Motor Products Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1210-11 (D. Kan. 1998).
86. 10 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (D. Kan. 1998).
87. Tran, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1202.
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"not addressed the issue" of the EEOC guidelines, the guidelines "offer
some guidance. 88 Based on this, the court found that the business ne-
cessities given by the employer including: "(1) to ensure that all employ-
ees and supervisors could understand each other during cell meetings; (2)
to prevent injuries through effective communication on the production
floor; and (3) to prevent non-Vietnamese employees from feeling as if
they were being talked about by Vietnamese employees" did prove le-
gitimate business necessities for the policy.89 The court also found that
even if these were not business necessities, the employee did not prove
that the policy led to discrimination or "adversely affected his employ-
ment in any way."90 Therefore, the court upheld summary judgment for
the employer.9 However, the court pointed out that the analysis was
fact-based and "the court does not foreclose the possibility that in some
circumstances, an English-only policy may constitute a violation of Title
VIi."
92
The court in Olivarez v. Centura Health Corporation93 similarly
skirted the issue of the EEOC Guidelines.94 An employee, unsatisfied
with the way the employer handled his complaints of discrimination, quit
his job and alleged disparate treatment under Title VII, in part because of
a policy prohibiting Spanish. 95 Here, the district court did not adopt or
reject the EEOC guidelines, even though the employer relied on the
EEOC guidelines to prove business necessity. 96 Instead the court, grant-
ing summary judgment for the employer, simply stated the employee did
not show that the English-only policy "resulted in a job detriment to
him."
97
Like in Tran and Olivarez, the court in Barber v. Lovelace Sandia
Health Systems 98 also declined to definitively adopt or reject the EEOC
guidelines, but still considered the guidelines while analyzing the Eng-
lish-only policy.99 The employer, Lovelace, a New Mexico health care
provider, announced the implementation of an English-only policy at a
staff meeting at one of its facilities. 100 Two bilingual employees, work-
ing at the Lovelace facility at the time, felt they were carefully scruti-
nized to make sure they were not using Spanish after the policy was im-
88. Id. at 1210.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1211.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1211n.18.
93. 203 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Colo. 2002).
94. See Olivarez, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1224-25.
95. Id. at 1220-21, 1223.
96. See id at 1224.
97. Id. at 1225.
98. 409 F. Supp. 2d 1313 (D.N.M. 2005).
99. See Barber, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 1327-28.
100. Id. at 1319.
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plemented.' 0 ' One employee resigned and the other was transferred to
another Lovelace clinic. 0 2 The district court stated that in analyzing the
case it would presume that the Tenth Circuit would give deference to the
EEOC guidelines and presume that the employees established a prima
facie case of disparate treatment.10 3 Under these assumptions, the court
found that the employer had a "legitimate and non-discriminatory reason
for the policy."' 04 Therefore, the court granted summary judgment for
the employer.'0 5
All of these cases show that the lower courts did not want to adopt
or reject the EEOC guidelines without guidance from the Tenth Cir-
cuit. °6 However, instead of offering guidance, the Tenth Circuit failed
to clarify this confusion by embracing a disparate impact analysis and
referencing the EEOC guidelines in an opinion considering an English-
only policy. 1
07
B. Maldonado v. City of Altus' °8
In 2002, the City of Altus, Oklahoma, established an English-only
policy. 10 9 The policy required City employees to speak English for all
"work related and business communications during the work day."'" 0
However, the policy allowed employees to communicate with a Spanish
speaking "citizen, business owner, organization or criminal suspect" in
Spanish, and the policy did not apply during lunch, breaks, or when em-
ployees were involved in personal conversations."' The policy also al-
lowed employees with limited English skills to "discuss the situation
with the department head and the Human Resources Director to deter-
mine what accommodation is required and feasible."
'1 12
Once the written policy was established, the employees claimed that
in practice the policy was more expansive than the written requirements
specified." 3 The employees asserted that the policy restricted them from
speaking Spanish whenever a non-Spanish speaker was present, includ-
ing during breaks and on the phone.' 14 The employees also complained
that they were teased by non-Spanish speaking employees about the Eng-
101. Id. at 1320.
102. Id. at 1324-25.
103. Id. at 1335-36.
104. Id. at 1337-38.
105. Id. at 1334.
106. See id. at 1334-35; Olivarez v. Centura Health Corp., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1224-25 (D.
Colo. 2002); Tran v. Standard Motor Prod., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1210 (D. Kan. 1998).
107. Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1303-06 (10th Cir. 2006).
108. 433 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2006).
109. Maldonado, 433 F.3d 1294 at 1299-1300.
110. Id. at 1299.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1300.
114. Id.
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lish-only policy."l 5 The City's Street Commissioner was aware of the
tension the policy created because he told one of the Spanish speaking
employees that "he was informing them of the English-only policy in
private because [he] had concerns about 'the other guys making fun of
[them].""' 16
The employer claimed the policy was put in place to facilitate effec-
tive radio communication on the city radios, to address complaints that
non-Spanish speaking coworkers felt uncomfortable when Spanish
speaking employees were "speaking in front of them in a language they
could not understand," and to increase safety around heavy equipment.
1 7
The EEOC tried to resolve the dispute over the policy and was unsuc-
cessful.1 18 The district court granted summary judgment and dismissed
all of the employee's claims, including the claim that Title VII was vio-
lated under a disparate impact and a disparate treatment analysis. 19
The Tenth Circuit considered a claim of discrimination based on na-
tional origin under Title VII, in addition to several other claims not aris-
ing under Title VII.
120
The court addressed the employees' Title VII claim using a dispa-
rate impact analysis. First, the court began by confirming that an Eng-
lish-only policy may qualify as national origin discrimination.12 1  The
court also established that the employees did not have to prove discrimi-
natory intent; they just had to prove that the policy led to disparate im-
pact, in this case by creating a hostile working environment for Hispanics
based on the English-only policy. 22 Second, the court explained that
once an employee establishes disparate impact, the employer has the
burden to show business necessity as articulated by the Supreme Court in
Griggs. 123
The court analyzed the employee's prima facie case, explaining that
when determining if there is enough harm to establish a prima facie case
of disparate impact, each English-only policy case "turns on its facts."
The court cited the teasing and the extension of the English-only policy
into breaks, lunch hours, and private phone calls as evidence "that the
English-only policy creates a hostile atmosphere for Hispanics in their
workplace."'
124
115. Id. at 1301.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1300.
118. Id. at 1301.
119. Id. at 1302.
120. Id. at 1298 (discussing all the claims brought by the plaintiffs including equal protection
claims, a claim of retaliation, and a claim that the First Amendment was violated by the policy).
121. Id. at 1303.
122. Id. at 1303-04.
123. Id. at 1304.
124. Id.
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Next, the court considered the EEOC guidelines. The court hesi-
tated to make a decision on the effect of the guidelines, pointing out that
while the Ninth Circuit rejected the guidelines altogether, the decision in
this case only required the court to find that the EEOC was reasonable on
the matter so it would not be "unreasonable for a juror to agree that the
City's English-only policy created a hostile work environment for its
Hispanic employees."'' 25  In its final conclusion, the Tenth Circuit did
not adopt the EEOC guidelines stating:
[W]e are not suggesting that the guideline is evidence admissible at
trial or should be incorporated in a jury instruction. What we are say-
ing is only that a juror presented with the evidence presently on the
record in this case would not be unreasonable in finding that a hostile
work environment existed.
126
The court also found that a reasonable person may find there was not a
business necessity for the English-only policy, so summary judgment for
the employer was not appropriate.
127
Finally, the court found summary judgment on the disparate treat-
ment claim was not proper because the employees had evidence of a hos-
tile work environment, which may show the employer's intent to dis-
criminate.128
IV. ANALYSIS
There is value in language as a reflection of culture and ethnicity,
but there is also value in allowing employers to run their businesses
safely and effectively. The disparate impact analysis under Title VII
balances these values and is also consistent with the legislative intent of
Title VII.
A. Problems with the EEOC Guidelines
The contrast between the EEOC guidelines and a disparate impact
analysis illustrates the problems with applying the guidelines. The
EEOC guidelines differ from a disparate impact analysis because they
create a presumption that English-only policies discriminate based on
national origin without requiring proof of discrimination. 129 Unlike dis-
parate impact, once there is evidence proving an employer implemented
an English-only policy at all times or only at certain times, an employee
is relieved of any burden of proving the policy led to discrimination or
125. Idat 1305-06.
126. Id. at 1306.
127. Id. at 1307
128. Id. at 1308; see also id. at 1298 (reversing summary judgment on the intentional discrimi-
nation and equal protection claims and affirming summary judgment on the remaining claims, in-
cluding a claim of retaliation and a claim that the First Amendment was violated by the policy).
129. Outten & Peratis, supra note 14, at 299-300, 321.
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caused harm to employees in a Title VII protected class.' 30 Additionally,
even if there is no discrimination or harm, a policy applied at all times
will be presumed to violate Title VII under the EEOC guidelines. 131 A
policy applied only at certain times may not violate Title VII under the
EEOC guidelines if there is a business necessity for the policy, but this
presumption again arises without a requirement that there is discrimina-
tion or harm to an employee in a Title VII protected class.
32
This is problematic because without harm, the Supreme Court has
found there is no actionable discrimination claim. 33 In a sexual harass-
ment case arising under Title VII, the Supreme Court found that harm
must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment"' in
order for there to be an actionable discrimination claim. 34 Even though
the case concerned intentional sexual harassment, the Ninth Circuit, con-
sidering an English-only policy, relied on the case to find that discrimi-
nation must be severe or pervasive because the Supreme Court's ration-
ale also applied to neutral policies that led to discrimination.135
The presumption under the EEOC guidelines that an English-only
policy discriminates also requires an employer that implemented an Eng-
lish-only policy at certain times to provide a defense for discrimination
that may have never occurred or harm that is not "pervasive."' 3 6 If the
policy is applied at all times, the employer has no defense, even if the
policy does not lead to discrimination or harm. 37 Under the EEOC
guidelines, discrimination would be presumed in the case of the radio DJ
in Jurado who was limited by an English-only policy that did not allow
him to continue to use "street Spanish" in his radio program, regardless
of whether this limitation was harmful or discriminatory. 138 Disparate
impact, on the other hand, recognizes that if there is no discrimination or
harm, an employer should not be penalized for an employment policy.
39
In the case of the radio DJ, the DJ may still show discrimination, but if
there is no discrimination in practice or harm as a result of the policy, the
case ends and there is no need for the employer to show business neces-
sity to defend a non-discriminatory practice.14
0
The EEOC's attempt to place the burden for a Title VII claim con-
cerning an English-only policy on the employer demonstrates its failure
130. Jd. at 320-21.
131. Id.
132. Id
133. See Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,67 (1986).
134. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67.
135. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1488-89 (9th Cir. 1993).
136. Spun Steak, 998 F. 2d at 1489.
137. See Outten & Peratis, supra note 14, at 320-21.
138. Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1987).
139. Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1409.
140. See id.
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to recognize judicial precedent, academic and scholarly analysis, and the
legislative intent of the 1991 Act. Furthermore, the EEOC ignores the
valid competing interests of employers and employees when considering
a discrimination claim under Title VII.
14 1
B. Disparate Impact Protects Employee Language and Employer Rights
1. Language and National Origin
Language is an integral part of national origin because language is a
reflection of a person's culture and ethnicity. As a result, discrimination
can occur based on the language a person speaks. Accordingly, language
as a part of national origin can be protected under Title VII.1
42
Sociologists and sociolinguistics recognize that language is part of
national origin because it is a reflection of ethnicity, community, and
cultural traits. 143 The existence in American society of foreign language
newspapers, television, and schools demonstrates that foreign language is
a thread that links communities and cultures that speak common lan-
guages together. 144 For example, Spanish is the language used by the
ancestors of Latinos and links that population together by national ori-
gin.145 Language also affects the way a person's national origin is per-
ceived because people react to others based "upon our perception of
their racial and ethnic status ... [e]thnic 'traits' and personal characteris-
tics are often more accurate predictors of prejudicial behavior than a per-
son's actual national origin."'146 Courts have also recognized that lan-
guage is tied to culture and ethnicity making it a part of a person's na-
tional origin. 147
In Gutierrez, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the importance of lan-
guage. 148 The court discussed the merits of having a multicultural soci-
ety and explained the connection between a culture and that culture's
language stating that "language remains an important link to ... ethnic
141. See 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-2(k) (West 2007); Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 67 (1986); Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1303, 1305 (10th Cir. 2006); Garcia v.
Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993); Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1039-40
(9th Cir. 1988); H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 24 (1991); Outten & Peratis, supra note 14, at 321.
142. Brief for ACLU, supra note 14, at 5-6; Outten & Peratis, supra note 14, at 299-300, 318-
23; Perea, supra note 3, at 274-79.
143. Perea, supra note 3, at 276 ("It is through the expression of ethnicity, one's cultural conti-
nuity and cultural traits, that 'national origin' has perceptible meaning. Primary language is recog-
nized in sociology and sociolinguistics as a fundamental aspect of ethnicity.").
144. Id. at 278 ("The existence in the United States of a thriving ethnic mother-tongue press,
non-English commercial broadcasting, and schools designed to preserve foreign languages demon-
strates that primary language is fundamental to ethnicity.").
145. David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousin's Lost Their Accents: Understanding the
Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-only Rules as the Product of Racial Dualism,
Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1347, 1364 (1997).
146. Outten & Peratis, supra note 14, at 300-01.
147. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1039.
148. See id at 1038-40.
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culture and identity... [t]he primary language not only conveys certain
concepts, but is itself an affirmation of that culture."' 149 The court ex-
plained that in order to protect language it adopted the "EEOC's business
necessity test."' 150 By specifically adopting the business necessity part of
the EEOC guidelines, this decision shows that it is not necessary to apply
the EEOC guidelines as a whole to protect language as a part of national
origin. Disparate impact uses business necessity and does not presume
harm, which is consistent with the Gutierrez court's emphasis on the
proper "balance" between the "individual's interest in speaking his pri-
mary language and any possible need of the employer."'15' When the
court adopted a business necessity test and applied the disparate impact
analysis to come to a result that protected the employees from discrimi-
nation based on national origin, the court demonstrated that disparate
impact should be applied, rather than the EEOC guidelines.
152
In contrast, the Spun Steak court properly rejected the EEOC guide-
lines, but failed to consider the importance of language. The court fo-
cused on the fact that the bilingual employees spoke English, and there-
fore, were able to comply with the English-only policy. 53 The court's
focus on the feasibility of compliance with the English-only policy was
misplaced. Title VII protects employees from policies they should not
have to comply with because the policies interfere with the culture and
ethnicity associated with language as a part of national origin. 154  The
court should have focused on whether the English-only policy discrimi-
nated because it limited, classified, or segregated the employees. 5 5 The
Maldonado court corrected this by applying disparate impact to protect
language as a part of national origin without focusing on the ability of a
bilingual speaker to comply with an English-only rule.'
56
The Tenth Circuit in Maldonado demonstrated that language can be
protected under the disparate impact analysis by making the role of lan-
guage an integral part of the disparate impact analysis. 7 By comparing
an English-only policy to a policy requiring religious groups to wear a
badge, the Maldonado court properly addressed the protection required
for employees with a primary language other than English. The court
explained:
149. Id. at 1039.
150. Id. at 1040.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1040, 1044-45.
153. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487.
154. See Cameron, supra note 145, at 1352-54.
155. Id. at 1362 ("The fair-and literal-reading of the statute is that limiting, segregating, or
classifying an employee 'in any way' which would even 'tend' to deprive her of employment oppor-
tunities, or to 'adversely affect' her employment status, is 'unlawful."').
156. Juliet Stumpf, English-Only Cases: Litigating the Diverse Workplace, 34 A.B.A. SEC.
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 6 (2006).
157. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1304-05.
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A policy requiring each employee to wear a badge noting his or her
religion, for example, might well engender extreme discomfort in a
reasonable employee who belongs to a minority religion, even if no
co-worker utters a word on the matter. Here, the very fact that the
City would forbid Hispanics from using their preferred language
could reasonably be construed as an expression of hostility to His-
panics.
158
Based on the understanding of the value of language as a part of national
origin, the employee was able show a prima facie case that an English-
only policy caused disparate impact based on national origin. 59 The
court referenced the EEOC guidelines only to show that it is reasonable
for a jury to conclude there may be a hostile work environment as the
result of an English-only policy, not to show that national origin can only
be protected by a presumption that English-only policies always create a
hostile work environment. 160 This demonstrates that the Tenth Circuit
did not need to apply the EEOC guidelines to protect employees from
discrimination.
2. Employer Rights
There is no exact definition of the business necessity that employers
are required to prove in a disparate impact analysis.' 61 However, there is
good reason for allowing employers to make decisions on how to effec-
tively run their businesses.
First, employers need the freedom to enact policies to run their busi-
nesses safely. In an article focusing on the importance of protecting lan-
guage as a part of national origin, the author concedes that effective su-
pervision is a legitimate business justification for an English-only pol-
icy.' 62 Moreover, if employers need employees to work in hazardous
work environments it is in the best interest of the employer, as well as
the employee, that there is effective communication in case of an emer-
gency: "In hazardous or potentially hazardous work environments or in
emergency situations, safety is always a legitimate business interest.
1 63
The argument may be made that hazardous work environments are
not safer when an English-only policy is in place. In the extreme, the
argument may be extended to claim that these policies prevent an em-
ployee from reporting an emergency situation because that employee
cannot report the emergency in English, but is afraid to violate the policy
158. Id. at 1305.
159. See id. at 1304-06.
160. Id. at 1306.
161. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(1), at 32-35 (1991).
162. Perea, supra note 3, at 307.
163. Linda M. Mealey, Note, English-Only Rules and "Innocent" Employers: Clarifying
National Origin Discrimination and Disparate Impact Theory under Title VII, 74 MINN. L. REV.
387, 434 (1989).
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by reporting it in his or her primary language. 164  The court in
Maldonado counters this argument effectively when it points out that,
"[i]t would be unreasonable to take offense at a requirement that all pi-
lots flying into an airport speak English in communications with the
tower or between planes. ' 65 The Maldonado court's analogy demon-
strates that employers are entitled to run a safe business and implement
policies to facilitate safety.' 66 The EEOC guidelines fail to reflect this
legitimate right of employers by placing the burden to show business
necessity on the employer first, regardless of whether the policy has a
discriminatory impact. 1
67
Second, an employer needs the freedom to run his or her business
productively and efficiently. 68 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the
freedom of a business to make policies to run a productive business in
Jurado.169 The court, applying a disparate treatment analysis and a dis-
parate impact analysis, emphasized that a radio DJ can be required to use
English only on his program because "[s]uccess in radio depends on ap-
pealing to specific segments of the listening community," which is a le-
gitimate business interest.1 70 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit, in a case on
an English-only policy issued before the EEOC guidelines, recognized
that "[j]udges, who have neither business experience nor the problem of
meeting the employees' payroll, do not have the power to preempt an
employer's business judgment.'
17 1
The Ninth Circuit went even further in recognizing the rights of
employers to run their businesses in Spun Steak noting that:
A privilege, however, is by definition given at the employer's discre-
tion; . . . an employer may allow employees to converse on the job,
but only during certain times of the day or during the performance of
certain tasks. The employer may proscribe certain topics as inappro-
priate during working hours or may even forbid the use of certain
words, such as profanity. 
172
While these cases emphasize the rights of employers, the
Maldonado court's analysis of business necessity shows that while busi-
nesses are allowed some deference to make policies to effectively and
safely run their businesses, a disparate impact analysis does not over-
164. Lisa L. Behm, Comment, Protecting Linguistic Minorities under Title VII: The Need for
Judicial Deference to the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 81
MARQ. L. REv. 569, 599 (1998).
165. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1305.
166. See id. at 1306-07.
167. Id. at 1305.
168. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1975) (discuss-
ing an employer's right to determine how to properly run a business).
169. Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1410.
170. Id.
171. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 271 (5th Cir. 1980).
172. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487.
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value this deference to employer's needs at the cost of allowing dis-
crimination against employees. 173 For example, the Maldonado court
indicates that an English-only policy to facilitate communication over the
company radio may be a legitimate business necessity. 174 However, the
court found that there was no evidence that the policy was enacted to
correct this problem or that the problem even existed, so the court did not
affirm summary judgment for the employer. 75 This demonstrates that
properly applied, business necessity does not sacrifice employees' rights
because employers must have a legitimate business necessity, not just an
explanation, for a policy that discriminates in practice. 176 Moreover, the
Amicus Curiae Brief from the ACLU on the side of the employees in
Maldonado, while favoring the EEOC guidelines, spent half the brief
applying a disparate impact analysis, showing it is a standard that can be
applied fairly.' 77 Overall, the Maldonado court's opinion demonstrates
that a disparate impact analysis can be applied to balance the rights of
employers and prevent discrimination, without protecting employees or
employers to the disadvantage of the other party.
C. Legislative Intent
The 1991 Act unequivocally demonstrated the legislative intent to
codify the disparate impact analysis set forth in Griggs.'78 The House
Report noted that "[t]he Griggs decision has had an extraordinarily posi-
tive impact on the American Workplace."' 179 Moreover, the House Re-
port on the 1991 Act pointed out the test set forth by Griggs favors both
employers and employees by improving working conditions and improv-
ing procedures and standards used by employers.'
80
Even prior to 1991, courts considered the legislative intent of Title
VII to create a balance between preventing discrimination and preserving
an employer's freedom to run a business.' 8' The Supreme Court, in a
case considering gender discrimination under Title VII, stated that its
repeated "emphasis on 'business necessity' in disparate-impact cases...
and on 'legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason[s]' in disparate-treatment
cases ... results from our awareness of Title VII's balance between em-
ployee rights and employer prerogatives."'182 In contrast, the approach in
the EEOC guidelines of presuming that an English-only policy is dis-
173. See Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1306.
174. See id at 1306-07.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 1306.
177. Brief for ACLU, supra note 14, at 9.
178. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 23-28 (1991).
179. Id. at 25.
180. Id ("Major corporations have had to rethink their personnel policies .... In doing so,
many found that they have improved the working conditions of all employees ... there have been
improvements in their procedures and standards .... ").
181. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242-43 (1989).
182. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242-43.
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criminatory fails to achieve this balance because it favors "employee
rights" over "employer prerogatives. 183
In rejecting the EEOC guidelines in Spun Steak, the Ninth Circuit
recognized the guidelines go against the legislative intent behind Title
VII:
It is clear that Congress intended a balance to be struck in preventing
discrimination and preserving the independence of the employer. In
striking that balance, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff in a
disparate impact case must prove the alleged discriminatory effect
before the burden shifts to the employer. The EEOC Guideline at is-
sue here contravenes that policy by presuming that an English-only
policy has a disparate impact in the absence of proof.
18 4
The Tenth Circuit opinion in Maldonado is not consistent with the
legislative intent of Title VII because the court refers to the EEOC guide-
lines, but applies a disparate impact analysis. The court pointed out the
EEOC guidelines are "'not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority"' and proceeded to give minimal importance to the EEOC
guidelines. 185 However, instead of deferring to the legislative intent of
Title VII and proceeding with the disparate impact analysis that the opin-
ion relied on up until that point, the court pointed out that while it is "not
suggesting that the guideline is evidence admissible at trial or should be
incorporated in a jury instruction," it is suggesting that the guidelines are
an "indication of what a reasonable, informed person may think about the
impact of an English-only work rule on minority employees, even if we
might not draw the same inference."'1 86 In light of this discussion of the
EEOC guidelines, it may have been logical for the court to draw a con-
clusion about the role of the EEOC guidelines and a separate conclusion
about a disparate impact analysis, but the court did not draw a conclusion
on either analysis. 187 Also, the court cited the EEOC guidelines to de-
termine that a reasonable jury may conclude that an English-only policy
creates a hostile work environment. 188 However, a reasonable jury may
draw the same reasonable conclusions based on a disparate impact analy-
sis, and therefore, any reference to the EEOC guidelines is unnecessary
and confusing. 189 While the court failed to recognize the legislative in-
tent of Title VII, it still properly applied a disparate impact analysis.
The impact of this inconsistency in the courts is demonstrated in the
brief drafted by the ACLU on the side of the employees in Maldonado
183. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489-90.
184. Id. at 1490.
185. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1305-06 (citing Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489-90).
186. Id. at 1306.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 1303-06.
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that was compelled to apply both the EEOC guidelines and a disparate
impact analysis. 190 This confusion can be corrected if future decisions
from all the circuits follow the legislative intent of Title VII and use a
disparate impact analysis.
CONCLUSION
The conflict between the Ninth Circuit's complete rejection of the
EEOC guidelines and the Tenth Circuit's hesitation to reject the guide-
lines outright demonstrates that there needs to be an affirmative decision
on what standard to apply when an English-only policy is at issue. The
EEOC guidelines presume that English-only policies cause harm, while a
disparate impact analysis uses burden shifting, which preserves the bal-
ance between the needs of employers and the protection of employees
from discrimination. Without a definitive adoption of a disparate impact
analysis or the EEOC guidelines, employers and employees cannot know
what policies constitute discrimination under Title VII. In order to re-
solve this conflict, the disparate impact approach should be uniformly
accepted. As the country's foreign population continues to grow, Title
VII's protection of national origin becomes increasingly important and
the disparate impact approach should be utilized by the courts in order to
preserve legislative intent, protect employers by allowing employers to
run business safely and effectively, and protect language as an integral
part of a person's national origin.
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